One of the most prominent stylized facts in corporate finance is that firms are more likely to issue equity following periods of high stock returns. We document that firms exhibit such timing behavior only in response to high returns that coincide with strong institutional investor demand for their stock. When not accompanied by institutional purchases, stock price increases have little impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. The results suggest that potential issuers pay close attention to who stands by their stock prices.
Introduction
Equity market timing is widely regarded to be a major objective of corporate financial policy. In recent years, market timing has also come to be seen as having a first-order impact on capital structure. 1 Under the market timing hypothesis, firms attempt to time their security issues to exploit mispricing of their equity. There are obvious difficulties with this idea, such as why investors would be willing to take the losing side of transactions that are understood to be timingmotivated. Despite these difficulties, the market timing view maintains its popularity because it conforms with empirical evidence. The tendency of firms to issue equity following periods of high stock returns constitutes one of the most well-known stylized facts in corporate finance and is often interpreted as direct evidence of timing behavior.
In this paper, we take a closer look at the timing of equity issues and find that issuers do not respond to stock returns per se. High stock returns trigger equity issues only when they coincide with strong demand from institutional investors. When not accompanied by institutional purchases, high stock returns have little impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. In other words, potential issuers care not only about having high stock prices but also about who stands behind those prices.
We argue that issuers' concern about institutional demand is a manifestation of asymmetric information problems in equity issuance. When firms know more about their intrinsic values than outsiders do, equity issue announcements are greeted as bad news by the market. In standard adverse selection models such as Myers and Majluf (1984) , this market reaction is deterministic since investors are assumed to be homogeneously informed. In reality, investors differ substantially in their information. For example, some investors may possess private information about firm value that other market participants lack. Part of this private information is likely to find its way into the stock price during the registration period (i.e., from the announcement of the equity issue to the offer date). Suppose, for example, that the stock price starts to fall following the announcement. If they have a positive assessment of the firm, informed investors may step in and add to their holdings of the stock, in effect "supporting the price" via their demand. Potential issuers are likely to be highly concerned about whether they can count on such demand by informed 1 See, for example, Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Huang and Ritter (2005) . 1 investors. We formalize these ideas with a simple model that we develop in the next section. We associate informed investors in the model with institutional investors that produce information for trading purposes in practice.
We then proceed with an empirical analysis of the timing and outcomes of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). We highlight four main findings. First and as already discussed above, we find that high stock returns trigger equity issues only when accompanied by high institutional investor demand. In particular, firms appear to pay close attention to the number of institutional investors establishing new positions in their stock. To give a sense for the magnitudes, the unconditional per-quarter probability that a firm announces an SEO is 1.21%. When the previous quarter's excess stock return is in the top quintile but the number of institutions initiating positions in the stock is in the bottom quintile, the SEO announcement probability is only 0.60%. However, when both the excess return and the number of institutional initiations are in their respective top quintiles, the SEO announcement probability jumps to 4.21%. This institutional demand effect remains robust in multivariate probit regressions that control for various firm characteristics, stock characteristics, and time fixed effects. Interestingly, firms do not seem to condition on the trading demand of their existing institutional shareholders in deciding whether to issue equity. It is only the demand by new institutional shareholders that matters for the likelihood of announcing an
SEO.
Second, we analyze stock returns during the announcement-to-offer period. It is well known that SEO announcements generate negative stock price reactions on average. We find that this negative SEO announcement effect is similar for firms with high versus low pre-announcement institutional demand. However, firms with high (low) pre-announcement institutional demand experience a full reversal (worsening) of the negative SEO announcement effect during the postannouncement period. We interpret this finding as evidence that institutional purchases support the stock price during the SEO period.
Third, we examine issuers' stock returns during the period immediately following the offer. This is the period during which market participants learn about the outcome of the SEO and in particular about institutional demand for the issuer's stock. We find that issuers with high offerquarter institutional demand outperform those with low demand by about 7% in the post-offer part of the offer quarter and another 6% in the following quarter. A 13% return differential in less than two quarters is quite large; it indicates that the market participants pay a great deal of attention to the resolution of uncertainty regarding institutional participation in the SEO. This finding also poses a puzzle: high-demand issuers seem to leave too much money on the table; it looks like they could issue shares at substantially higher prices by waiting a bit more.
Finally, we analyze the long-run stock returns of issuers. Previous research has documented that SEOs underperform in the long run. Whether such underperformance is due to mispricing is a source of ongoing debate in the literature. The results discussed above show that firms strongly time their equity issues to coincide with increased institutional demand. Furthermore, issuers with relatively high demand exhibit better stock return performance than other issuers around the time of their SEOs. Perhaps firms view periods of increased institutional demand for their shares as windows of opportunity in which they can sell overvalued equity. If so, one would expect high-demand issuers to underperform low-demand issuers in the long run. We find that this is not the case. While we confirm the finding in previous studies that SEOs underperform in general, there is no evidence of stronger underperformance for issuers with high institutional demand. In particular, the short-run gains of high-demand issuer that we discuss above are not reversed in the long run.
Taken together, our results point to the difficulty of successfully timing the market. Market timing is often described from a partial-equilibrium perspective, i.e., as an objective of issuers.
Clearly, firms would like to issue at the highest price possible, but investors are likely to recognize this timing motive and price the stock of issuers accordingly. Our results show that firms are concerned about how investors will react to an equity issue even after periods of exceptionally high stock returns. Potential issuers require not only high but also sustainable stock prices.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1 we develop the model. Section 2 describes the empirical setup. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and results. Section 4 concludes.
Equity issuance and institutional investors: a simple model
In this section, we present a simple model that highlights the role of institutional investors in the equity issuance process. The primary purpose of the model is to help fix ideas and motivate 3 the empirical tests; accordingly, the discussion in this section focuses on the basic aspects of the problem at hand. We delegate various details to the Appendix.
There are four dates (0, 1, 2, and 3), the discount rate is zero, and all agents are risk-neutral.
There is one firm that is either a 'good' or a 'bad' type. The firm type is characterized by the magnitude of a single cash flow V that accrues at date 3. A good-type firm receives V G = 1 whereas a bad-type firm receives V B = 0. The two types are equally likely; therefore, one can think of the initial (i.e., date-0) stock price to be 1/2.
At date 0, the firm has two kinds of shareholders, an insider and a group of outsiders. The insider holds a block of shares in the firm and privately knows the firm type. Outside shareholders have access to public information only. The total number of shares of the firm's stock is normalized to one. The firm is all-equity financed.
We motivate the firm's equity issue decision as stemming from the insider's liquidity needs.
Therefore, one should think of the SEO in this model as a sale of the insider's block to new outside investors. We pursue this modelling strategy to simplify the exposition. Our results remain the same in an alternative model in which the firm has projects itself and issues primary shares to raise capital.
We model the insider's liquidity needs in a simple way. With probability λ, a good-type insider faces a liquidity shock at date 0. When this happens, the insider gains personal access to a constant returns-to-scale project outside the firm that pays R ∈ (1, 2) units of output per unit of input. A bad-type insider never faces a liquidity shock. 2 Whether the insider receives a liquidity shock is not publicly observable. The insider has no cash on hand and cannot borrow from alternative sources, so she has to sell her equity stake in order to invest in her project (if she has one). For simplicity we do not allow partial sales; the insider sells either all of her shares or none. In the rest of this section, we refer to the liquidity-constrained good type as G L , the unconstrained good type as G U , and the bad type as B . Notice that since R > 1, G L would want to sell all of her shares and invest in her project if she could obtain a fair price for her shares (i.e., V = 1). Also, since R < 2, G L will choose to sell none of her shares if she expects to receive the date-0 (i.e., average) price of 1/2.
2 As will become clear below, whether the bad type has a project or not does not affect our results in any material way. The assumption we make is intended to facilitate the interpretation that a bad type has purely opportunistic motives to sell equity. The firm's stock is traded in the market at dates 1 and 2. We describe the details of the trading process below. After observing the date-1 stock price P 1 , the insider decides whether to sell her stake in an SEO or keep it. If the insider decides to sell her stake, the SEO is conducted at date 2. We do not model the details of the SEO process. The insider sells her stake at the market price P 2 . The game ends at date 3 with the payment of V to the firm's shareholders.
We analyze two cases: a benchmark case with symmetrically-informed investors, and the main case of interest with privately-informed investors. Figure 1 summarizes the timing of the events in these two cases.
Case 1: Symmetrically-informed investors (Myers-Majluf )
Consider the benchmark case where investors (i.e., market participants other than the insider)
are symmetrically informed about firm type. This case essentially replicates Myers and Majluf (1984) . In the static model of Myers and Majluf there is no stock return prior to the issuance decision. Since we are mainly interested in how potential issuers respond to stock returns, we allow for some new public information to arrive at date 1 and move the stock price. Specifically, at the start of date 1 all market participants observe a public signal θ = V + , where is a standard normal random variable. 3 Examples of public information that θ summarizes are analysts' earnings forecasts, news about the demand for the firm's products, etc.
Since information is symmetric among investors, the stock trades at P 1 = E(V | θ) at date 1. After observing this stock price, the insider decides whether to sell her shares in an SEO. Let I SEO = 1 (= 0) denote the decision to sell (not to sell). Clearly, G U always announces I SEO = 0, since she is better off consuming V G = 1 rather than selling undervalued shares. Now consider B.
If G L is expected to announce I SEO = 1 with positive probability given P 1 , B strictly prefers to announce I SEO = 1 in order to sell overpriced equity. If G L is expected to announce I SEO = 1 with zero probability given P 1 , B is indifferent between I SEO = 1 and I SEO = 0, since in either case she receives V B = 0 (recall that B does not have a project). In such cases we assume without loss of generality that B announces I SEO = 0. 4 Thus, B fully pools with G L for any realization of P 1 .
Our main interest is in what G L decides to do. Suppose that, given a particular realization of P 1 , investors anticipate G L to announce I SEO = 1. Before the announcement, the expected firm value is P 1 . Upon observing I SEO = 1, investors revise their expectation of the firm value downward:
This is the familiar SEO announcement effect. Before the announcement, investors put positive weights on the firm being one of G U , G L , and B. Since G U never issues equity, the SEO announcement reveals that the firm type is not G U and hence increases the probability that it is B. Importantly, the SEO announcement is the last informational event in the model; therefore, the date-2 stock price P 2 is also given by the revised expected value in (1). In making the SEO decision, then, G L compares P 2 to her opportunity cost:
Let P 1 denote the value of P 1 that satisfies (2) as an equality. If
In words, an equity issue takes place only after a positive stock return from date 0 to date 1.
Case 2: Privately-informed investors
Consider now the main case of interest in which the stock price is determined by trading activity among heterogeneously-informed investors. Following standard market microstructure models, we introduce three types of investors: informed traders, noise traders, and market makers.
Informed traders correspond to professional investors that conduct research and produce information for trading purposes in practice. At the start of date 1, informed traders privately observe a signal s ∈ {L, H} on firm type. If the firm type is bad, s = L. If the firm type is good, s = H with probability q and s = L with probability 1 − q. We assume that the insider does not observe the realization of s. 5 Notice that from the perspective of G L , there is some chance (q) that informed traders recognize the firm type, but there is also some chance (1 − q) that this is not the case. 6 We model informed traders as a continuum of competitive (e.g., price-taking) agents. Informed traders hold no shares of the firm's stock at date 0. Suppose that the stock trades at price P t at some subsequent date t. Then, informed traders' demand for the stock at date t is given by
The demand function h t reflects two assumptions that we make about informed traders. First, informed traders face a short-selling constraint. When their expected return on the stock is negative (i.e., when s = L), informed traders do not trade because of the binding short-selling constraint. 7 Second, when s = H, informed traders' demand is a decreasing function of P t . This assumption captures in a reduced-form way various trade-offs informed traders face in selecting their portfolios. The most straightforward interpretation is that informed traders find it costly to hold undiversified positions in the stock (due to risk-aversion or institutional diversification objectives). Given such costs, a higher expected gain 1 − P t induces larger optimal positions. An-5 Of course B infers that s = L by construction. 6 The assumption that H reveals the firm type simplifies the analysis considerably, but otherwise this assumption is not essential. Our main results go through as long as H is a sufficiently precise (but not necessarily noise-free) signal of a good type.
7 In practice, institutional investors such as mutual or pension funds (which the informed traders are modelled after) are typically restricted from short-selling. For example, Almazan et al. (2004) document that most mutual funds have either explicit rules or implicit policies against short-selling activity.
other interpretation is that there are sidelined informed traders who find the stock less attractive relative to their alternative investment opportunities. Under this interpretation, an increase in 1 − P t triggers a purchase by the marginal sidelined traders. 8
The firm's stock is publicly traded at dates 1 and 2. Consider date 1 first. Noise traders demand a random number of shares n 1 , which is a draw from the standard normal distribution.
Let x 1 denote the number of shares that informed traders choose to trade at the market price P 1 .
A risk-neutral and competitive group of market makers clear the market at price P 1 , which equals the expected value of V conditional on the aggregate date-1 order flow d 1 ≡ x 1 + n 1 . Notice that the informed traders' demand x 1 depends on their private signal s. Therefore, P 1 can be written as a function of the pair (s, n 1 ). Essentially, the pricing rule P 1 corresponds to a noisy rational expectations equilibrium.
The market equilibrium at date 2 is similar to date 1. Noise traders demand a random number of shares n 2 , which is a draw from the standard normal distribution. Let x 2 denote the number of shares that informed traders choose to trade at the market price P 2 . The market makers clear the market at price P 2 , which equals the expected value of V conditional on the aggregate date-1 order flow d 1 , the aggregate date-2 order flow d 2 ≡ x 2 + n 2 , and the insider's SEO announcement
Equilibrium in the stock market
We start by characterizing informed traders' optimal trades x 1 and x 2 given the stock prices P 1 and P 2 :
If informed traders observe H, they learn that the firm type is good and add x 1 = 1 − P 1 shares to their holdings at date 1. A decrease (increase) in the stock price at date 2 makes informed traders buy more (sell some of their existing) shares. If informed traders observe L, their optimal demand is zero and hence they do not trade at either date (recall that the short-selling constraint binds in this case).
Given the optimal strategy of informed traders, stock prices at date 1 and date 2 are calculated as conditional expectations of firm value:
Notice that since V G = 1 and V B = 0, P 1 and P 2 correspond to conditional probabilities that the firm type is good. The equations in (5) characterize P 1 and P 2 implicitly. For example, P 1 is a function of d 1 = x 1 + n 1 , but informed traders' demand x 1 depends on P 1 . We delegate the full characterizations of P 1 and P 2 to the Appendix and state here some of their standard properties without proof:
• The market is semi-strong form efficient: E (P 2 |d 1 ) = P 1 .
• The date-1 stock price P 1 is strictly increasing in the date-1 order flow d 1 . The same is true for P 2 with respect to d 1 and d 2 provided that the SEO announcement does not fully reveal the firm type.
The SEO decision
As in Case 1, G U always announces I SEO = 0 and B always pools with G L . Our main interest is again in what G L does. Suppose that, given the particular realization of P 1 , market participants anticipate G L to announce I SEO = 1. Before the announcement, the expected firm value is P 1 .
Upon observing I SEO = 1, market makers revise their expectation of the firm value downward:
Notice that (6) is identical to (1): the SEO announcement reveals that the firm type is not G U and hence increases the probability that it is B. What is different in this case is that the date-2 stock price P 2 is not given by (6). Rather, P 2 is to be determined through date-2 trading activity;
that is, as a function of the date-2 aggregate order flow d 2 . In making the SEO decision, then, G L compares the expected date-2 price to her opportunity cost:
where the G-subscript signifies that the expectation is taken by G L . The following result provides a comparison of the two expectations in (6) and (7):
Proposition 1: For any realization of P 1 ,
The intuition for Proposition 1 is simple. Upon observing the announcement I SEO = 1, market makers adjust their estimate of firm value downward. The revised estimate also constitutes market makers' expectation of P 2 right after the announcement. However, P 2 is random and its realization depends on date-2 aggregate order flow d 2 . In predicting d 2 , the insider G L has an informational advantage relative to the market makers. This is because the insider knows her own type (that is, that the type is good), and hence assigns a higher probability to the event that informed traders have observed a high signal relative to market makers' expectations. In essence, the insider expects informed traders' demand to positively surprise the market makers and keep the stock price relatively high (or prevent it from falling too much). To put it differently, the insider anticipates stronger date-2 aggregate order flow d 2 than the market makers do. 9
Similar to Case 1, one can show that the expected value in (7) is strictly increasing in P 1 .
Therefore, there exists a cutoff P * 1 at which (7) is satisfied as an equality. If
In the Appendix, we show that P 2 < P 1 with probability one; therefore, E G (P 2 | d 1 , I SEO = 1) < P 1 . Since R < 2, it follows that
Comparison of Case 1 and Case 2
In Case 1, date-1 stock price P 1 is set in response to the public signal θ. In this case, G L (and hence B, since B fully pools with G L ) decides to sell equity if P 1 exceeds the cutoff P 1 . In Case 2, P 1 is set in response to date-1 aggregate order flow d 1 which acts as a noisy indicator of informed traders' signal. In this case, G L (and again B) decides to sell equity if P 1 exceeds the cutoff P * 1 . In both cases, the cutoff values exceed 1/2, which represents the unconditional expected firm value.
Interpreting 1/2 as the initial stock price in the model, equity issues in both cases follow positive stock returns.
In which case a given P 1 is more likely to trigger an equity issue? From Proposition 1, it follows that P * 1 < P 1 . Not surprisingly, there are no equity issues following very low prices (P 1 < P * 1 ).
Also not surprisingly, sufficiently high prices (P 1 > P 1 ) trigger equity issues regardless of how P 1 is reached. The interesting region is P 1 ∈ (P * 1 , P 1 ). In this region, an equity issue takes place only if P 1 is set in response to informed trading activity. If the same price obtains via the arrival of public information, firms choose not to issue equity. This prediction constitutes the basis of our main empirical tests.
Discussion and further issues
Alternative modelling choices and assumptions: Our model highlights the role privatelyinformed investors play in the equity issuance process. To make the comparison to the benchmark case of symmetrically-informed investors as clear as possible, we present the benchmark case as a separate model; that is, the two models are not nested. The non-nested model formulation captures much of the intuition we want to illustrate. Furthermore, one can argue that the two cases that we analyze correspond to different conditions firms may face at the time their issuance needs arise (e.g., a recent runup in the stock price of a firm may have been triggered by public news or by order flow). We have also analyzed a nested version of the model in which stock prices react to both public news and informed trading activity. Similar to the current model, the nested model delivers the prediction that a particular realization of P 1 is more likely to be followed by an equity issue announcement if P 1 reached through higher aggregate order flow d 1 (rather than a higher public signal θ).
Another modelling choice concerns insiders' information regarding the realization of informed traders' signal. Throughout the analysis we make the conservative assumption that the insider has access to public information only in assessing the likelihood of informed trading. In practice, firms may also make use of non-public information about demand conditions when making their issuance decisions. For instance, most top-tier investment banks also have trading desks that possess private information about their institutional clients' demand. Anecdotal evidence suggests that such private information finds its way into firms' issuance decisions through the assistance of investment bankers. In the notation of the model, firms may observe not only d 1 (as we assume), but also x 1 or a noisy version of x 1 . In the interest of brevity we do not formally analyze this alternative model; we simply state its (not-so-surprising) prediction that good types are more likely to issue when they learn informed traders' signal to be high.
The relationship of the model to market timing: Our model describes firms' financing choices in an asymmetric information context. Market timing, on the other hand, refers to firms' tendency to issue equity following high stock returns. In principle, these two phenomena are distinct from each other. Past stock returns do not play any particular role in the simple static adverse selection model of Myers and Majluf (1984) . Perhaps due to the wide influence of that model, market timing is typically viewed in the literature as a behavioral phenomenon rather than a manifestation of asymmetric information. While the behavioral view is of interest on its own, there is a natural connection between market timing and asymmetric information once the simple static framework is replaced by a dynamic one. By reducing misvaluation from the viewpoint of good types, high stock returns alleviate the adverse selection problem and trigger equity issues.
In our model, the adverse selection problem is initially severe, in the sense that good types are not willing to issue equity at the average price 1/2. Good types decide to issue only following sufficiently high stock returns, captured by relatively high values of P 1 .
Interpretation of date-2 informed demand as gradual diffusion of information:
We model informed traders as receiving their private information at date 0 and trading on it at dates 1 and 2. In particular, if date-2 stock price is low informed traders step in and purchase additional
shares. An alternative interpretation of the model is that information diffuses gradually among investors. Under this interpretation, the purchases made by early informed traders at date 1 signal to the insider that more informed traders will receive their information and purchase the stock at date 2.
Announcement effects and announcement-to-offer returns:
In the model, the registration period (i.e., the period between the SEO announcement and the actual offer) is compressed into a single trading date, date 2. Thus, date-2 trading activity should be interpreted as being spread out throughout the whole registration period. This interpretation has implications for announcement effects and announcement-to-offer returns, which we now discuss. Essentially, the strength of demand during the registration period determines how high the offer price P 2 will be relative to the stock price just prior to the announcement P 1 . Part of the return P 2 /P 1 is realized around the announcement day (i.e., "the announcement effect") and part of it is realized as the announcement-to-offer return. Notice that, unlike in Myers and Majluf (1984) , both of these returns are functions of firm type and random noise trader demand. Good-type SEO announcers expect higher values of both returns than bad-type SEO announcers do, since good types count on informed traders to "support the price" through their high demand. Nevertheless, the actual realizations of the announcement effect and the announcement-to-offer return for a good type may be negative due to low noise trader demand.
The empirical setup

Data and sample construction
The initial sample of potential SEO announcers consists of all firm-quarter observations in the intersection of CRSP, COMPUSTAT and CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13F) databases for 84 quarters from 1985:01 to 2005:04. We restrict the sample to exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), utilities (SIC codes 4900-4949), and firms that have issued equity within the previous two quarters. In most of our analysis, we also exclude firms that had less than 5% institutional ownership in the previous four quarters. Our final sample of potential SEO announcers consists of 244,475 firm-quarter observations.
We use the CDA/Spectrum database to calculate the institutional ownership and demand variables. CDA/Spectrum reports quarterly snapshots of institutional investors' portfolios ex-13 tracted from 13F reports filed with the SEC. 10 The types of institutions covered by this database are banks, insurance companies, investment companies, independent investment advisors, and an "others" category that includes mainly pension funds. As in previous studies that use this data, we approximate institutions' quarterly trades by calculating the difference in their holdings between two consecutive reports.
The initial SEO sample consists of all SEO announcements reported by the Securities Data Corporation (SDC) for firms that are in our final sample of potential SEO announcers. We restrict the sample to exclude spinoffs, unit offers, and rights offerings. Our final SEO sample consists of 2,961 SEO announcements and 2,784 completed offers.
Throughout the analysis, we calculate excess stock returns by subtracting the returns of benchmark portfolios that are rebalanced quarterly using a double sort on size and book-to-market (B/M) ratio. To construct the benchmark portfolios used in quarter q, firms are sorted into five size portfolios using their market equity at the end of q − 2 and the breakpoints corresponding to NYSE market equity quintiles at the end of q − 2. Within each of these size portfolios, firms are then sorted into five B/M portfolios using the book equity reported in quarter q − 2 divided by market equity at the end of q − 2. 11
Definitions and summary statistics of institutional demand variables
Institutional investor demand for a given stock can be measured in several different ways. In this regard, we make two particular choices. First, we use variables that reflect changes in (as opposed to levels of) institutional holdings. While clearly informative about institutions' views, level variables are affected by other factors that create noise for our purposes. For example, one would expect certain types of stocks (e.g., larger, more liquid) to have higher levels of institutional ownership. Change variables track demand shifts more closely; they also provide more meaningful comparisons to the effects of stock returns. Second, our demand variables are count-based (e.g., the number of institutions purchasing the stock). The alternative would be to aggregate trades across institutions (e.g., change in institutional ownership). While the two approaches provide similar qualitative results, count-based measures perform better quantitatively. 12
Specifically, we construct two institutional demand variables for each stock i -quarter t pair.
Buy minus Sell is the number of institutions increasing their holdings (including position initiations) minus the number of institutions decreasing their holdings (including position terminations)
in stock i in quarter t. Initiation is the number of institutions initiating new positions in stock i in quarter t. Both variables are normalized by the number of institutions holding the stock at the beginning of quarter t. In calculating the institutional demand variables, we restrict attention to firms that exhibit more than 5% institutional ownership during the past four quarters.
Notice that Initiation is a component of Buy minus Sell by construction. Since Buy minus Sell provides a more complete representation of institutional demand, we start our analysis in Section 3 using this variable. However, as we show below, all the explanatory power of Buy minus Sell is due to its inclusion of Initiation. Once we establish this result, we use Initiation as our main empirical construct in the rest of the analysis. Table I reports the summary statistics of the institutional demand variables. Along with Buy minus Sell and Initiation, we also report statistics on Change in ongoing positions, which is defined as the difference between Buy minus Sell and Initiation.
As Panel A.1 shows, Buy minus Sell has a quite symmetric distribution with a median of zero. is in line with the finding in previous studies that institutional investors tend to buy recent winners (see, for example, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) ). The fact that the contemporaneous return correlation is considerably higher than the lagged return correlations is indicative of the price impact of institutions' trades. That is, stock prices seem to react positively to purchases by institutional investors. The demand variables are positively correlated with the market-to-book ratio and negatively correlated with firm age and firm size (measured by book assets). However, none of these correlations are very high. Overall, the institutional demand variables exhibit substantial variation that is independent of past and contemporaneous stock returns and firm characteristics.
Results
The equity issuance decision
In this section, we present our main results that link the equity issuance decision to past stock returns and institutional demand. The variable of interest is the probability that a firm-quarter is associated with an SEO announcement, which we take as an indicator of intention to issue equity.
For ease of interpretation, we first report SEO announcement probabilities in simple univariate and bivariate sorts using past stock returns and institutional demand as the sorting variables. We then check the robustness of the basic patterns in these simple sorts by estimating multivariate probit regressions that include several control variables.
The unconditional quarterly probability that a firm announces an SEO in our sample is 1.21%.
It is well-known that firms are more likely to issue equity following high stock returns. We start by verifying this finding in our sample. In each quarter, we sort firms into quintiles based on previous quarter's excess stock return. We then calculate the percentage of firms within each quintile that announce an SEO during the quarter. Panel A in Table II reports the time-series averages of these percentages. 13 As expected, stock returns have a strong impact on the likelihood of SEO announcements. Firms in the highest return quintile are almost ten times more likely to announce SEOs than firms in the lowest return quintile. We also report the results separately for the sub-samples of firms with more and less than 5% institutional ownership. In Panel B, the institutional demand variable is Buy minus Sell. As the panel shows, stock returns and institutional demand have a strong interaction effect on the likelihood of SEO announcements. When institutional demand is in its lowest quintile, moving from the lowest to the highest stock return quintile increases the announcement probability by only 1.08%. While this increase is statistically significant, its magnitude is quite small (recall that the unconditional SEO announcement probability is 1.21%). When institutional demand is in its highest quintile, however, we see that stock return has a very strong effect on the SEO announcement probability.
Moving from the lowest to the highest return quintile in this case increases the announcement probability from 0.39% to 4.06%. Conversely, institutional demand has a weakly positive effect when the stock return is low or moderate, but a very strong positive effect when the stock return is high.
The demand variable Buy minus Sell is composed of position initiations as well as changes to ongoing positions of institutional investors. Position initiations may constitute a relatively less noisy indicator of investors' views on the stock. Changes to ongoing positions are likely to be driven in part by flows and liquidity considerations. Furthermore, issuers may be more concerned about demand from new investors than demand from their existing shareholders. 15 To see which component of institutional demand matters more for the equity issuance decision, we repeat the double-sorting exercise described above for each component of Buy minus Sell.
14 Recall that we calculate the institutional demand variables only for firms with more than 5% institutional ownership during the past four quarters. Accordingly, most of our analysis below focuses on the sample of firms with more than 5% institutional ownership.
15 Placing the issue with the existing shareholders may require larger price concessions (e.g., as compensation for the larger undiversified positions these shareholders would have to hold). Table II reports the results for Initiation. The interaction effect discussed above exhibits itself even more strongly in this case. Consider the highest return-lowest institutional demand cell. The average excess stock return in this case is 37.60% (not reported in the table).
Panel C of
The probability of an SEO announcement, however, is only 0.60%; that is, less than half of the unconditional probability. Similarly, in the lowest return-highest demand cell, the probability of an announcement is only 0.70%. When both the return and institutional demand are in their highest quintiles, however, the probability of an announcement jumps up to 4.21%.
In Panel D of Table II , the institutional demand variable is Change in ongoing positions, which is the difference between Buy minus Sell and Initiation (i.e., the number of existing institutional shareholders that increase their holdings minus the number of those that decrease or terminate their holdings). Notice that institutional demand defined this way has very little impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. Within any return quintile, moving from the lowest to the highest demand quintile causes a very small and at best marginally significant increase in the probability of an SEO announcement. It appears that almost all of the explanatory power of Buy minus Sell is due to its inclusion of Initiation. Table II constitute our main findings regarding the impact of institutional investors on the equity issuance decision. We now discuss some robustness issues. First, one may be concerned about the fact that institutional demand and stock returns are positively correlated. Table I , we see that the demand-return correlations are at moderate levels and hence unlikely to cause multi-collinearity problems. However, even moderate levels of correlation may obscure the effects of each sorting variable. 16 Second, the analysis so far does not control for other potential determinants of the equity issuance decision.
The results in
From Panel C of
We address both concerns by estimating probit regressions of the following form: 
+c 6 X i,t−2 + c 7 Quarter fixed effects t ).
In (9), Announce i,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if firm i announces an SEO in quarter t and zero otherwise. High Demand i,t−1 (Medium Demand i,t−1 ) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if institutional demand in quarter t − 1 is in the highest quintile (middle three quintiles) and zero otherwise. The regression includes the excess stock return in quarter t − 1 and its interactions with the demand dummies. 17 The vector X i,t−2 denotes a set of control variables measured as of the end of quarter t − 2. The control variables are as follows.
First, we include the excess stock return in quarter t − 2. The concern here is that institutional demand in quarter t − 1 may be positively correlated with previous quarter's stock return (see Table I Panel C). Second, we control for institutional ownership (the fraction of firm's stock held by institutional investors) at the end of quarter t − 2. Third, we control for a number of firm characteristics that previous research has identified to be correlated with equity issues. These variables are Firm age measured as the logarithm of the number of quarters since IPO, Firm size measured as the logarithm of book value of assets, Market-to-book ratio, Profitability measured as EBITDA divided by book assets, and Book leverage. We estimate (9) by including time fixed effects for each quarter t and clustering observations at the firm level. Table III reports the results, which replicate the basic patterns in Table II . The stock return in quarter t − 1 has a significant effect on the SEO announcement probability in quarter t, but the magnitude of this effect is quite small. An increase of 100% in excess stock return increases the announcement probability by only 0.79% for firms with low institutional demand. When institutional demand is measured by Initiation, moving from the lowest to the highest demand quintile adds 2.26% to the announcement probability. There is also a strong interaction effect; an announcement is substantially more likely following high stock returns that are accompanied by high institutional demand. Both the level and the interaction effects of institutional demand are largely reduced when demand is measured by Change in ongoing positions. The control variables exhibit the expected signs. The probability of announcement increases with the stock return in quarter t − 2, institutional ownership, firm size, market-to-book ratio, and book leverage, and decreases with firm age.
To summarize, firms are more likely to issue equity following periods in which both their stock return and the institutional demand for their stock are relatively high. High stock returns that are not accompanied by high demand have very little impact on the likelihood of issuance. The results are primarily driven by demand from new institutional investors. Whether the existing institutional shareholders exhibit positive or negative demand does not appear to affect the issuance decision in a material way.
Stock returns in the announcement-to-offer period
By announcing an SEO, a firm indicates its intention to issue equity. The offer itself typically takes place several weeks after the announcement (in our sample, the median number of trading days between the announcement and the offer is 21). At the time they announce their SEOs, firms are primarily concerned about the offer price at which they will be able to sell their shares.
Accordingly, we now analyze stock returns during the announcement-to-offer period. In particular, we ask whether stock returns following an announcement in quarter t can be predicted based on institutional demand in quarter t − 1. Whether one should expect to find any such return predictability depends on the extent to which quarter t−1 institutional demand is public information at the time of the quarter t SEO announcement. Part of the information content of institutional demand is likely to be already reflected in the stock price at the time of the announcement due to the price impact of trades that the demand variable is composed of. However, there may still be some residual private information that institutional demand reflects.
In this section and in the remainder of the paper, we focus on Initiation as the institutional demand variable. Specifically, we assign each SEO announcement into one of five demand groups using the Initiation quintile breakpoints obtained from all potential issuers in the quarter prior to the announcement. Since firms in the highest demand group are the most likely to announce 20 as documented in the previous section, there are more SEO announcements in this group than in other demand groups.
We are interested in comparing announcement-to-offer period stock returns across different institutional demand groups. However, this comparison is problematic because the length of the registration period (the period between SEO announcement and the offer) varies across SEOs.
We use two different approaches to deal with this problem. First, we analyze 60 trading-day post-announcement returns for all SEO announcements (i.e., including those that are not followed by an offer within 60 trading days). This approach provides a clear representation of the effect of institutional demand on post-announcement returns. However, some of the observations correspond to delayed or withdrawn offers. As a second approach, we focus on SEOs that are completed within 60 trading days from the announcement. 18 This reduces the possibility that the announcement-to-offer returns are dominated by large positive/negative returns associated with SEOs that stay in registration for extremely long periods. While it allows us to calculate announcement-to-offer returns, this approach is subject to a sample selection bias: firms that experience negative returns following their announcements are more likely to delay or withdraw their offers.
Panel A of Table IV reports the results with the two approached described above. In the first two columns, the sample includes all SEO announcements. The first column reports the announcement effect, defined as the excess stock return in the (−1, +1) three-day window around the announcement. The second column reports the excess stock return in the (+2, +60) window following the announcement. In the next two columns, the sample is restricted to SEO announcements that are followed by an offer within 60 trading days. The third column reports the excess stock return in the (+2, offer) window following the announcement; that is, from two days after the announcement to the last trading day before the offer. The fourth column reports the offer discount, defined as the offer price divided by the last closing stock price.
As documented by previous studies, the announcement effect is on average negative. In other words, the market greets an equity issue as bad news. More importantly for our purposes, the negative reaction to SEO announcements is similar across different pre-announcement institutional demand groups. The offer premium also does not vary in a statistically significant way across different demand groups. In contrast, stock returns following the announcement period increase with pre-announcement institutional demand. While firms with relatively low pre-announcement demand (those in the bottom four demand groups) experience negative returns that add to their negative announcement effect, firms in the highest demand group experience a positive return of 3.87% that more than offsets their negative announcement effect of -1.89%. As Panel B shows, these results remain qualitatively similar in regressions that control for past excess returns and institutional ownership.
The basic result that emerges from Table IV is that issuers with high pre-announcement institutional demand benefit from relatively better stock-price performance in the post-announcement period. The finding raises two questions. First, does institutional demand predict short-term returns in general or only around SEO announcements? In unreported analysis, we find that there is very little return predictability based on institutional demand in general. This indicates that the information content of institutional demand is somewhat unique to either SEO episodes or the types of firms that resort to SEOs. Second, do issuers have access to privileged information about institutional demand at the time they make their SEO decisions? Anecdotal evidence suggests that issuers indeed obtain such information through the connections of their investment bankers.
Furthermore, the results in the previous section show that the issuance decision is highly sensitive to institutional demand. However, our findings are not sufficient to conclude that issuers have privileged information about institutional demand. As in the model of Section 1, issuers and market makers may both have access to the same information regarding trading activity (i.e., both observe aggregate order flow). The sensitivity of the issuance decision to institutional demand may simply reflect the fact that institutional demand is part of aggregate order flow.
Stock returns around and following the offer
In this section, we focus on the relationship between offer-quarter institutional demand and the stock returns in the period immediately following the offer. This is the period during which market participants learn about the outcome of the offer and in particular about institutional demand for the issuer's stock. Our objective is to investigate how the market reacts to this resolution of uncertainty.
We start by sorting all completed SEOs in our sample into five groups based on the Initiation demand variable calculated in the offer quarter. Panel A of Table V reports the average excess returns of each demand group over various periods both in the offer quarter and the next quarter.
Not surprisingly, the excess stock returns in the offer quarter are highly correlated with the institutional demand in the same quarter: SEOs with offer quarter's demand in the top quintile experience 21.71% excess returns in the offer quarter, while those in the bottom quintile experience -2.82% excess returns in the same period. The results are similar in the three-day period around the offer day: SEOs in the top demand quintile experience excess stock returns that are 1.81%
higher on average than those in the bottom demand quintile in the three-day period. This pattern is repeated in the post-offer part of the offer quarter. High-demand issuers experience excess stock returns that are 7.15% higher than low-demand issuers.
Although the magnitude of these return differentials are substantial, this analysis is problematic because the causality is ambiguous. Since we do not observe the within-quarter institutional demand, the results we document here are also consistent with institutional feedback trading:
institutions may demand more of SEOs that perform well in the offer quarter, around the offer day, and following the offer.
In order to alleviate the causality concern, we focus on the quarter immediately following the offer quarter in the last column of Panel A of Table V . SEOs in the top demand quintile in the offer quarter outperform those in the bottom quintile by 5.83% in the next quarter. In unreported analysis, we find that most of this return differential is obtained in the first half (45 days) of the quarter. This is consistent with other market participants observing the institutional demand during the offer quarter through the 13F reports that institutional investors have to file within 45 days of the end of the offer quarter. Combining the offer quarter's post-offer return and the return in the quarter after the offer results in a 13% return differential between high-demand and low-demand issuers, which is quite large for a period of less than two quarters. This indicates that market participants pay a great deal of attention to the resolution of uncertainty regarding institutional participation in the SEO.
We repeat the same analyses in a multivariate setting and report the results in Panel B of Table V . Here we find that the effect of offer quarter's institutional demand on excess returns are robust to the inclusion of past returns, lagged institutional ownership and quarter fixed effect.
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The only exception is the effect of institutional demand on the offer premium which becomes statistically insignificant.
<TO BE COMPLETED>
Long-run stock returns following the offer
The results so far show that firms strongly time their equity issues to coincide with increased institutional demand. Furthermore, issuers with relatively high demand exhibit better stock return performance than other issuers around the time of their SEOs. Perhaps firms view periods of increased institutional demand for their shares as windows of opportunity in which they can sell overvalued equity. If so, one would expect high-demand issuers to underperform low-demand issuers in the long run. Since the previous section already documents the effect of institutional demand on the stock performance in the quarter immediately following the offer quarter (t + 1),
we focus here on the long-run returns (1/3/5 years) starting from the next quarter (t + 2).
We use two different approaches to detect long-run performance: event-time and calendartime. The event-time approach consists of calculating the average event-time long-run returns, which are the sample averages of SEO-specific average of monthly excess returns calculated during one/three/five years following the quarter after the issuance. Since this approach can only be used in a descriptive fashion for reasons pointed out in Barber and Lyon (1997) and Brav (2000) , our discussion and statistical tests will be focused on the calendar-time approach. This approach consists of calculating the time-series monthly three-factor alphas of portfolios of firms that have issued SEOs in the past one/three/five years.
As reported in Panel A of Table VI , SEO firms in our sample experience relatively low stockreturn performance in the five years following the SEO. The long-run underperformance following SEOs is widely documented in the literature (see, for example, Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000) ). The question of interest for us is whether this underperformance varies as a function of institutional demand around the time of the SEO. Since long-run performance tests tend to have low power, we split our SEO sample into two groups instead of the five groups we use in earlier sections. 19 In particular, we sort all SEOs in our sample on Initiation
19
The results are qualitatively similar if we split the sample into five groups.
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into two demand groups. Panel B (C) of Table VI reports the average SEO performance for SEO groups sorted on Initiation in the pre-announcement (offer) quarter. While high-demand SEOs seem to underperform slightly more than low-demand SEOs, the differences between the two groups are not statistically significant.
Conclusion
It is well-known that firms are more likely to issue equity following periods of high stock returns.
We document that firms do so only if high return periods coincide with strong demand from institutional investors. Stock price increases that are not accompanied by institutional demand have little impact on the likelihood of equity issuance. Issuers with strong pre-announcement institutional demand outperform those with low demand during the announcement-to-offer period; that is, they are able to issue shares at relatively more attractive prices. Also, issuers with high institutional demand around the time of the offer experience significant gains in the short run following the offer. These gains are not reversed in the long run. Overall, our results highlight the importance of asymmetric information problems in equity issuance. Firms appear to pay considerable attention to who stands by their stock prices in deciding whether to issue equity.
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Appendix: Derivations and proofs
Derivation of stock prices in Case 2: Let f denote the probability density function of the standard normal distribution. First, consider the date-1 stock price:
(A1) implicitly defines P 1 as a function of d 1 = x 1 + n 1 . It is easy to show that a solution Next, consider the date-2 stock price. If G L is expected to announce I SEO = 0 in equilibrium given the realization of P 1 , then
If G L is expected to announce I SEO = 1 in equilibrium given the realization of P 1 , then
where
Again, it is easy to show that a solution P 2 (d 2 | P 1 ) always exists. Unlike for P 1 , however, P 2 need not be unique. For some values of P 1 , there is a range of d 2 such that multiple values of P 2 solve (A4). In such cases, we select the equilibrium P 2 to be the largest solution to (A4). If P 1 is such that the equilibrium selection rule is used, then the function P 2 (d 2 | P 1 ) is discontinuous 
Proof of Proposition 1:
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Suppose that the firm announces I SEO = 1. Then
where the first equality follows from the law of iterated expectations.
In calculating E (P 2 | d 1 , I SEO = 1), G L and the market makers differ only in their estimates of the probability that informed traders' signal equals s = H. Using this fact, we have
s and the market makers' conditional probability estimates that s = H, respectively:
Furthermore,
The inequality follows because P 2 is a strictly increasing function of d 2 and P 1 > P 2 for any value 27 of n 2 . Since (A8) and (A9) show that the two bracketed terms in the second line of (A6) are both positive, it follows that (-1,+1 ) three-day excess stock return around the announcement. Announcement (+2,+60) is the excess stock return from two days after the SEO announcement to 60 days after the announcement for all announced SEOs. Announcement(+2,offer) return is the excess stock return from two days after the announcement to the last trading day before the offer for announcements followed by an offer within 60 trading days. Offer discount is the offer price divided by the last closing price before the offer for announcements followed by an offer within 60 trading days. Panel B reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of Announcement (+2,+60) and Announcement-to-offer return. The independent variables are the demand dummy High Demand i,t-1 , which takes the value of one if firm i is in the highest Initiation quintile in quarter t-1, and zero otherwise, Excess Return i,t-1 , and Institutional ownership i,t-2 . The t-statistics of the coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses.
Panel A: SEO announcements sorted on pre-announcement institutional demand The table reports long-run returns after SEOs as a function of institutional demand as measured by Initiation. Panel A reports the long-run performance for the entire sample, while Panel B (C) reports the performance for SEOs with preannouncement (offer) quarter's Initiation above and below the median. Event-time returns are cross-sectional averages of SEO-specific average of monthly excess returns calculated during one/three/five years after the end of the first quarter after the SEO. Calendar-time returns are time-series monthly three-factor alphas of portfolios consisting of firms that have issued SEOs in the past one/three/five years. High minus Low portfolio is a zero-cost portfolio with long (short) position in high (low) institutional demand portfolio. Panel D reports the monthly alphas of portfolios consisting of non-SEO firms starting at the end of the quarter immediately following the quarter in which Initiation is measured. The tstatistics reported in parentheses are from standard errors calculated using Newey-West corrections with twelve lags. 
